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Bender: Tort Liability

TORT LIABILITY FOR SERVING ALCOHOL: AN
EXPANDING DOCTRINE
Jeanne Matthews Bender
I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law there was no liability on the part of one selling
or furnishing liquor to "an able bodied person."' Increasing awareness of the havoc wrought by intoxicated persons, particularly on
the highways, has led to a gradual erosion of the common law position. Since the advent of the modern highway system, courts have
been increasingly willing to find liability on the part of commercial
vendors.2 A few jurisdictions have moved beyond vendor liability
and have extended liability to social hosts. In almost every instance, these attempts have been limited by subsequent legislation.
This comment examines the current state of this essentially
judicially created cause of action. It concludes that the time has
come for Montana to reexamine its common law position on tort
liability for social hosts and vendors and recognize a limited cause
of action.
II.

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

Common Law Recognized No Cause of Action

Before the invention of the automobile, the one most likely to
suffer injury from an intoxicated person was the drinker herself.
The common law acknowledged this fact. Selling or giving intoxicating liquor to a "strong and able-bodied" person was not negligence and did not impose liability on the provider.$ Claims against
the provider were usually rejected unless the intoxicated person
was "an infant of tender years, or an idiot, or a person non compos
mentis, from any cause."'4 This attitude was carried forward into
modern law with courts frequently noting that the act of drinking
rather than providing liquor causes intoxication.5
1. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889).
2. Note, Common Law Liability of Liquor Vendors, 31 MoNT. L. REv. 241 (1970). The
author of the note discusses this trend and many of the early cases imposing liability on
vendors.
3. Cruse, 127 Ill. at 234, 20 N.E. at 74.
4. McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 169 (1883). In McCue, the court held that the plaintiff
had a cause of action against defendants who had induced her husband, "an habitual drunkard," to drink three pints of liquor. Id. The husband subsequently died and the court found
that, although the husband had agreed to partake, he was not in any condition to resist by
the time he drank the third pint. Id. at 170.
5. Note, supra note 2, at 242-43. See also Nevin v. Carlasco, 139 Mont. 512, 516, 365
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Liability Has Been Extended to Vendors

1. Dramshop Acts
Although a few courts allowed recovery from a vendor on the
theory that the seller's acts were particulary egregious, it was not
until the passage of Dramshop or Civil Damages Acts that liability
was imposed on any wide basis. These laws were passed in the latter part of the nineteenth century as a result of the Prohibition
Movement.7 Thirty-eight states have had dramshop acts at some
point in their history.8 Currently eighteen states have such laws in
effect and interestingly, three of those have been passed within the
last few years.9
Dramshop acts impose civil liability on sellers of liquor if the
plaintiff has established that she has met the requirements of the
statute. 10 These acts, however, may limit the amount of recovery 1
and frequently allow a cause of action only to certain defined parties. 1 2 When a dramshop act is in place, some courts have held that
the act is the exclusive remedy against a vendor and have refused
to allow recovery on any other theory.' 3 Conversely, other courts
have allowed common law negligence actions once it has been established that the dramshop act does not apply in the particular
circumstances.' 4 Montana has never had a dramshop act.' 5
2.

Common Law Negligence

A number of jurisdictions have permitted actions against commercial vendors using a negligence analysis. In any negligence case,
the plaintiff must establish certain elements: (1) that the defendant owed a duty recognized in law to the plaintiff, (2) that she
breached the duty, (3) that the breach was the cause of the plainP.2d 637, 639 (1961); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 356, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955).
6. Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 118-22, infra.
7. Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated
Guest, 59 N.D.L. REV. 445, 448-49 (1983).
8. Comment, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road"
Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1984).
9. Id. at 1125.
10. Note, supra note 7, at 451.
11. Id. at 450.
12. Comment, supra note 8, at 1127.
13. Stanner, Liability of Social Host for Off Premises Negligence of InebriatedGuest,
68 ILL. B.J. 396, 399 (1980).
14. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Holmquist v.
Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. App. 1984); Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978).
15. Comment, supra note 8, at 1124 n.23.
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tiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff was damaged. 6 The defendant's duty has been found in state statutes or in traditional common law.
A statute may be used to define the duty owed by a provider
of alcohol to others.17 All fifty states have adopted some sort of
liquor control act. These acts usually impose a criminal penalty on8
one who furnishes liquor to a minor or to an intoxicated person.1
To use liquor control statutes to define a vendor's duty, courts
have had to overcome two obstacles.
First, the plaintiff must show that she was a member of the
class of persons which the statute was intended to protect and that
the statute was intended to guard against the kind of harm she
had suffered.1 9 Twenty-four jurisdictions have found that their liquor control statutes were enacted to protect the general public.20
Others have refused to construe their liquor control acts this way.2"
Second, the statute in question must apply to the particular provider. Many of the control acts apply to "any person" 22 or "every
person '"23 and could be construed quite broadly. If the act is found
to apply, a violation will generally be held to be either negligence
per se or evidence of negligence.
The seminal case allowing recovery from a vendor under an
ordinary negligence theory was Rappaport v. Nichols. 4 Rappaport
involved service of liquor to a minor who was later involved in an
accident. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that although
the state had repealed its Civil Damage Act in 1934, "[t]he repealer left unimpaired the fundamental negligence principles
which admittedly prevail in New Jersey."'" The court determined
that the legislature had intended to protect the general public by
prohibiting sales of liquor to minors and intoxicated persons. Thus,
the seller could be liable for injuries caused by a customer when
Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980).
W. PROSSEa & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 220
(5th ed. 1984).
18. Comment, supra note 8, at 1137.
19. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 17, at 224-25.
20. Note, Injuries Arising from Negligence in Furnishing Liquor to Minors and Intoxicated Adults: New Tort Action in Wyoming. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408
(Wyo. 1983), 19 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 285, 290 n.51 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or.
632, 638, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971).
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-301(2) (1983). See also Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125
Mich. App. 261, 263, 335 N.W.2d 677, 679 (1983).
23. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(a) (West Supp. 1985).
24. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
25. Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
16.

17.
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the seller "knows or should know that the patron is a minor or
intoxicated. 2' The vendor argued that his conduct was not the
proximate cause of the injury, but the court said that a jury could
reasonably find such a causal relationship.
Since Rappaport a majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have recognized a statutory duty on the part of vendors and
have imposed liability. 2s Montana is not among these, however.
Some courts have ignored the statutes altogether and have found
the seller's duty to be based in the general common law duty each
person has to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.2 This duty can flow to a patron or to a third person injured
by an intoxicated customer:
C.
1.

Liability Has Been Found on the Part of a Social Host

Generally

Once the common law doctrine had been abrogated in the case
of the liquor vendor, courts in a number of jurisdictions attempted
to extend liability to non-commercial providers of alcohol. The
same bases-dramshop acts, liquor control statutes, and common
law negligence-were used to find liability, although not as successfully. In almost every case where a cause of action was recognized, the intoxicated person was a minor. Legislative bodies in
most jurisdictions responded by limiting the judicial doctrine in
some fashion. An examination of the case law is illustrative.
2.

Liability Based on Dramshop Acts

The language in some dramshop acts is quite broad, imposing
civil liability on "any person" who sells or gives liquor to another.3
This broad language appears to apply to the social host, but in
reality has been generally construed to apply only to those in the
business of selling liquor. 1 Two courts, however, have allowed a
cause of action against a non-seller based on a dramshop act.
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Williams v. Klemsrud,2 refused
26. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 9.
27. Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
28. Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 269-71, 429 A.2d 855, 863 (1980). See also
Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 674 n.3 (Alaska 1981).
29. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
See also Nazareno, 638 P.2d at 674 n.5.
30. Comment, supra note 8, at 1126.
31. Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of
Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETm L. REV. 561, 565 (1980).
32. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
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to restrict that state's dramshop act to vendors. It held that the
twenty-one year old defendant was liable for injuries caused when
he purchased liquor for his twenty year old friend who was subsequently involved in an automobile accident."3 The court further
held that contributory negligence was not a bar to plaintiff's action
because the dramshop act created a strict "statutory right

. . .

not

necessarily based upon fault or negligence.""' Thus, under Klemsrud, the defendant could not show that the injury was caused by a
combination of both plaintiff's and defendant's negligence.
Shortly after the Klemsrud decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court addressed a similar claim in Ross v. Ross. s5 Defendant in
that case purchased liquor for his nineteen year old brother. The
brother became intoxicated and died when he drove his car off the
road.36 The Minnesota court reviewed the history of the state's
dramshop act and concluded that the legislature intended it to apply to all those who might violate the liquor laws.37 Because Minnesota considered its statute to be 3both
remedial and penal, the
8
court adopted a liberal construction.
The legislatures of both Minnesota and Iowa responded by
amending their dramshop acts so that only those who are in the
business of selling liquor are liable under those acts.3 9 The courts
of both states, however, have continued to find remedies for third
parties injured by an intoxicated person. The Iowa act no longer
applies to sales to minors, but the court has held that where the
act does not apply, a common law negligence action may be
brought.'0 Similarly, the Minnesota court allowed a common law
negligence action to be brought against a social host, reasoning
that such an action is appropriate since the amended dramshop act
33. Id. at 615.
34. Id. at 617.
35. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
36. Id. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at 150.
37. Id. at 117, 200 N.W.2d at 150-51.
38. Id. at 120, 200 N.W.2d at 152. But see Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill.
App. 2d 412, 422, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964). The court in Miller declined to construe Illinois'
Dramshop Act liberally because it was penal in nature.
39. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West
Supp. 1985).
40. Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984). See also Clark v. Mincks, 364
N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985). In Clark the Iowa Supreme Court, over a powerful dissent, found
that common law negligence liability could be extended to a host who provided liquor to an
adult guest. Relying on Haafke, the court held that a criminal statute prohibiting the giving
of liquor to "any intoxicated person" did not exclude the social host. Id. at 231. The dissent
unsuccessfully argued that the Iowa General Assembly had intended to restrict liability to
licensed sellers when it amended that state's dramshop act. Id. at 233.
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does not apply to social hosts.41
3.

Ordinary Negligence

Courts in Michigan,4 2 Indiana," and Pennsylvania 44 were
among the first to find that liquor control statutes could be a basis
for civil liability of social hosts as well as vendors. Since the statutes were not worded in such a way that they only applied to vendors, these courts looked beyond the statutes to determine whether
they were intended to apply to anyone who provided liquor to
others.
Because the Pennsylvania legislature intended to protect "innocent third parties" when it enacted its liquor control statute, a
federal district court in that state held that the statute could support civil liability for a social host. 45 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, however, declined to adopt the view of the federal court.
Only four months after the federal court decision, the supreme
court held that only licensed sellers could be held civilly liable
under the liquor code."
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the purpose of that
state's liquor control statute was to protect the public from injuries
that might be caused by intoxicated minors.47 A proven violation of
the statute would be negligence per se.48 Construing the phrase
"any person" to include a social host, the Indiana Court of Appeals
also held that violation of a statute prohibiting furnishing of alcohol to minors was negligence. 49 Relying on an earlier decision
which held that violation of the statute by a vendor created liability, the Indiana court could find "no distinction between one who
sells alcoholic beverages to a minor and one who gives alcoholic
' 50
beverages to a minor.
41. Holmquist v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. App. 1984).
42. Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1974).
43. Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974).
44. Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
45. Id. at 263.
46. Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
47. Thaut, 50 Mich. App. at 613, 213 N.W.2d at 822.
48. Id.
49. Brattain,159 Ind. App. at 674, 309 N.E.2d at 156. The Indiana court recently held
that civil liability could be extended to "family, friend, or acquaintance" who furnishes alcohol to an intoxicated person. Ashlock v. Norris, Ind. App. , 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169
(1985). In Ashlock, the defendant purchased drinks for an adult friend who subsequently hit
and killed a pedestrian. The court relied on a statute prohibiting the giving of alcohol to an
intoxicated person in reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff did have a claim against the
defendant.
50. Brattain, 159 Ind. App. at 674, 309 N.E.2d at 156.
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It should be noted that most decisions favoring liability for
social hosts under liquor control statutes have addressed situations
where an adult provided liquor to a minor. A Minnesota court recently expressed the policy inherent in the extension of liability to
social hosts who serve liquor to minors:
Social policy dictates that individuals who procure intoxicating liquor for minors be held liable for damages caused by the minor.
The social ills from intoxication are grossly aggravated when minors are involved because of their documented inability to cope
properly with intoxicating liquor. Imposing civil liability discourages the illegal furnishing of liquor to minors; thus, it serves to
promote our strong public policy of preventing our youth from
causing senseless damage to themselves and the public.5'
Courts have been very reluctant to hold a social host liable for
injuries caused by an intoxicated adult. The Michigan court has
limited its holding to social hosts who knowingly supply liquor to
minors.52 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically stated
that "there can be no liability on the part of a social host who
serves alcoholic beverages to his or her adult guests."53 One court
did extend liability to a social host for furnishing liquor to an adult
guest using liquor control statutes, but was quickly overruled by
legislative action. Relying on previous holdings,54 the California
Supreme Court, in Coulter v. Superior Court,55 found an apart51. Holmquist, 352 N.W.2d at 52. The action in Holmquist was brought by the parents of a minor girl who had been served liquor at the home of the Millers. Ms. Holmquist
left the party in an auto driven by another minor who had been served liquor. She fell from
the car, sustaining fatal injuries. Id. at 49.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that, although the state's dramshop act applied
only to vendors, a social host could be liable under a common law negligence theory for

violating Minnesota's liquor control act. Id. at 52.
52. Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 266, 335 N.W.2d 677, 680.
53.

Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 511 (Pa. 1983). See also Sites v. Cloonan, 477

A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. 1984).
The Pennsylvania court did use a statute to find liability on the part of a host who
served his minor employee liquor at the company's Christmas party. Congini v. Portersville

Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983). Rather than a liquor control act, the court in Congini
noted that the Crimes Code made it a crime for a minor to consume liquor. Id. at 517.
Therefore an adult who furnishes liquor to a minor is an accomplice and negligent per se.
Id. at 518. Under this analysis the social host "may assert as a defense the minor's 'contributory' negligence." Id.
54.

In 1971, the California Supreme Court found a vendor civilly liable for injuries to

a third party caused by a minor to whom the vendor had sold liquor in violation of the
state's liquor control statute. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971). The following year the California Court of Appeal reversed earlier rulings and held

an employer to be liable for injuries caused by a minor who became intoxicated at the company Christmas party. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1972).
55.

21 Cal. 3d 144. 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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ment manager civilly liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated
adult guest. Coulter arose out of an automobile accident. The
plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was riding struck an
abutment. The driver had been served a large quantity of alcohol
in the recreation room of the defendant's apartment complex."6
To determine if the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
could support social host liability, the California Supreme Court
looked to legislative intent. The Legislature had indicated that the
purpose of the Act was "protection of the safety, welfare, health,
peace and morals of the people of the State. ' 57 The Act further
applied to "every person" who provided alcohol to an obviously
intoxicated person.5 8 The court thus held that "every person" included social hosts as well as vendors.5 9 After reviewing the statutory basis for liability, the court discussed principles of negligence.
It found its extension of liability to be in harmony with modern
negligence law:
Furthermore, well established general negligence principles lead
us to conclude, independently of statute, that a social host or
other non-commercial provider of alcoholic beverages owes to the
general public a duty to refuse to furnish such beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person if, under the circumstances, such
person thereby constitutes a reasonably foreseeable danger or risk
of injury to third persons.6 0
The court in Coulter, however, misread legislative intent.
Shortly after the Coulter decision, the liquor control statutes were
amended to preclude any liability except on the part of a licensee
who furnishes liquor to "any obviously intoxicated minor where
the furnishing. . . is the proximate cause" of injury or death to a
third person.6 1
Some courts have refused to find that liquor control acts im56. Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
57. Id. at 151, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. See also CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 23001 (West 1985).
58. Id. at 150, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 149-50, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
61. CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602.1 (West Supp. 1985). The amended statute states
in part:
The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the
holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (_
Cal. 3d __)
be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic
beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1985).
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pose a duty on the social host, yet have recognized a cause of action based on the duty one person owes to another. For example,
the Oregon Supreme Court, in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,2 found that liquor control statutes
are to be narrowly applied, but held a social host liable based on
"considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the partic63
ular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
In Wiener, the plaintiff was injured when the automobile in
which she was a passenger ran into a building. The minor driver
was returning from a fraternity party at which he had been served
alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff sued the owner of the property
where the party had been held, the purchaser of the alcohol, and
the fraternity. 4 The Oregon court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the property owner and the purchaser had violated Oregon's beverage control statutes, holding that those statutes were
not intended to protect injured third persons.6 5 But the court
found that "there may be circumstances under which a person
could be held liable for allowing another to become dangerously
intoxicated. '16 Because the property owner and the purchaser had
no control over the "direct dispensation" of the alcohol, the court
67
found no duty on their part to protect the plaintiff.
The court did find a duty on the part of the fraternity, however, "to refuse to serve alcohol to a guest when it would be unreasonable under the circumstances to permit him to drink. ' 68 The
court declined to articulate an absolute rule, indicating that each
case would "be decided on its own facts."6 9 In finding that a jury
could conclude the fraternity was negligent, the court noted that
(1) the driver was a minor, (2) the fraternity was directly involved
in serving liquor to him, and (3) the fraternity ought to have
known that he would be driving since he drove to the site which
70
was some distance from his home.
The Oregon Legislature responded to Wiener by narrowing
the court's flexible test and imposing liability only in certain defined situations. Under the current legislation neither a vendor nor
a social host is liable unless the liquor is served to one who is "visi62.

258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 640, 485 P.2d at 22 (quoting PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS 333 (3d ed. 1964)).
at 637-38, 485 P.2d at 20.
at 638, 485 P.2d at 21.
at 640, 485 P.2d at 22.
at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
at 639, 485 P.2d at 21.
at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
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bly intoxicated. ' 71 In the case of a third party injured by an intoxicated minor, liability will only be found if under the circumstances
a "reasonable person" would have requested identification or if altered or inadequate identification was used by the minor. 72 Thus
Wiener is probably still good law in Oregon, but will be limited by
the statutes in future cases.
One of the few courts-which has held a social host liable for
injuries caused by an intoxicated adult did so using a conventional
negligence analysis. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently held,
in Kelly v. GwinneU1, 78 that a provider of alcohol "has a duty to the
public not to create foreseeable, unreasonable risks by this
activity. ,74
Plaintiff Kelly was injured when her auto was struck by that
of Gwinnell. Gwinnell had been served alcohol at the home of the
Zaks. Although he testified that he had only had a few drinks, the
court found that he had probably had as many as thirteen shots of
Scotch. 75 Kelly sued both Gwinnell and the Zaks. Liability in Kelly
was premised on two major factors, foreseeability and fairness. The
duty of the provider only arises when the host is in a "position to
foresee quite clearly" that if she continues to provide alcohol to
her guest, that guest is likely to injure someone. 76 The court relied
on the fact that defendant Gwinnell's blood alcohol after the accident was 0.286%. An expert testified that he must have been
"showing unmistakable signs of intoxication" while still at the
77
Zaks' home.
Once a duty was found, the court looked at the state's policy
to determine if it was fair to impose liability on a social host. New
Jersey has made a particularly strong commitment to reduction of
drunk driving. 78 While expressing a concern that the decision could
interfere with social behavior, the court nevertheless said that the
deterrent effect of its ruling would result in a gain to society. 79 The
holding in Kelly, however, was carefully limited to situations
"where the host directly serves the guest and continues to do so
even after the guest is visibly intoxicated, knowing that the guest
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.950, 30.955 (1983).
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.960 (1983).
96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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will soon be driving home."8 0
Like Coulter, Kelly was a fairly predictable extension of prior
case law. In previous holdings New Jersey courts have imposed liability on a vendor whose minor patron had injured a third party, 81
a vendor when an intoxicated adult customer fatally injured himself, 2 and a social host for injuries caused by a minor guest.83 In
1972 a New Jersey Superior Court extended liability to a social
host for injuries caused by an adult guest.8 4 Thus Kelly cannot be
viewed as a radical departure from existing law, but rather as a
logical progression of the law in a single jurisdiction.
4. Effect of the Guest's Voluntary Ingestion of Alcohol
When the injured party is the guest herself, the host can raise
the issue of the guest's contributory or comparative negligence.
85
The host's liability is diminished as that of the guest increases.
When the suit is brought by a third party, it is likely that both the
drinker and the provider would have to share any liability imposed. The New Jersey court in Kelly adopted this approach, holding "that the host and guest are liable to the third party as joint
tortfeasors." 6
III. A
A.
1.

CAUSE OF ACTION IN MONTANA

Current Case Law Is Confusing

Vendor Liability

Montana follows the general rule that if a statute is enacted to
protect the public, violation of the statute is negligence per se.87
The Montana Supreme Court has never clearly defined the liquor
control statutes to be so enacted, however. The supreme court has
indicated that a violation of these statutes might be negligence per
se, 8 but the court has never imposed liability on a liquor vendor
80. Id. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
81. Rappaport, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1.
82. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
83. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
84. Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (1982).
85. Comment, Social Host Liability for FurnishingLiquor-Finding a Basis for Recovery in Kentucky, 3 N. Ky. L. REv. 229, 245 (1976).
86. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230. The court remanded the case. Mrs. Kelly
went to trial but during the proceedings the defendants' insurer settled for $172,500. She
will get $100,000 from Gwinnell and the remainder from the Zaks. See Expensive Pour,
TIME MAGAZINE, Mar. 4, 1985 at 73.
87. Azure v. City of Billings, 182 Mont. 234, 240, 596 P.2d 460, 464 (1979).
88. Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor Temple, 179 Mont. 145, 150, 586 P.2d 712, 715
(1978).
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under any theory.
Montana federal district courts, however, have twice held that
a vendor was liable for injuries to third parties caused by intoxicated patrons.8 9 In Deeds v. United States,9 0 a federal district
court imposed liability on an Air Force N.C.O. club where an intoxicated minor had been served liquor. The minor serviceman was
subsequently involved in an automobile accident in which the
plaintiff, a seventeen year old girl, was injured. Although the court
in Deeds discussed the violation of the liquor control statute," the
court looked beyond the statute to define the vendor's duty. Judge
William Jameson noted that there was no clear Montana law, but
determined that the Montana rules of proximate cause and foreseeability supported a finding of liability. 2 In his opinion, Judge
Jameson relied on the fact that the vendors violated Montana law
in furnishing liquor to the minor serviceman, knowing he "was a
minor and obviously or apparently intoxicated." 3 Additionally, the
defendant's agents knew that the only way for the young people to
return home from the air base was by private automobile.9 4
5 In
Deeds was followed in 1980 by Johnson v. United States."
that case, Judge Paul Hatfield found that violations of state statutes and Air Force regulations which prohibited vendors from serving alcohol after closing hours were negligence per se and a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.9 The court in Johnson did
not mention any Montana Supreme Court decisions in reaching its
holding.
In the years between the decisions in Deeds and Johnson,
89. Johnson v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 597 (1980) (bifurcated on the issue of damages, see 510 F. Supp. 1039 (1981)); Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (1969).
90. 306 F. Supp. 348 (1969). This case is discussed in 31 MoNT.L. REV. 214. Note,
supra note 2.
91. Id. at 359.
92. Id. at 361.
93. Id. at 359.
94. Id. at 363.
95. 496 F. Supp. 597.
96. Id. at 603-04. The plaintiff, Johnson, was a member of the United States Air
Force. In addition to his regular duties, he was employed part time at the N.C.O. Club at
Malmstrom Air Force Base. He and other employees, with the knowledge of the Club's manager and in direct violation of both Montana law and Air Force regulations, consumed liquor
at an "after hours" party on the Club premises. Johnson was severely injured in an auto
accident while being driven home from the Club by another party-goer, Hay. Hay was found
to be under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. Id. at 601.
Ignoring existing Montana case law, the court looked to Deeds and found that the violations of "closing hours" statutes and regulations were one of the proximate causes of Johnson's injuries. Although Hay's intoxication was "a 40% causative factor," it "was a foreseeable intervening cause and therefore [did] not cut off [defendant United States'] liability to
the plaintiff." Id. at 604.
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however, the Montana court addressed the issue of vendor liability
twice. In Folda v. City of Bozeman,97 the court refused to hold a
bar liable for the death of a minor patron and in Swartzenberger v.
Billings Labor Temple," the court found no negligence on the part
of a bartender who served an obviously intoxicated adult, who subsequently was killed. The court in Swartzenberger distinguished
Deeds on the grounds that the Swartzenberger claim was not
brought by a third party and involved no special knowledge on the
part of the bartender."
2. The Social Host
Montana's liquor control statutes prohibit furnishing of alcoholic beverages to those under nineteen years of age' °° and persons
"apparently under the influence of alcohol."10
' In spite of the
broad language in these statutes, the Montana Supreme Court, as
noted above, has never allowed imposition of civil liability under
them. In Runge v. Watts,' 2 the court refused to find a social host
civilly liable under either the liquor control statute or a criminal
0 3
statute prohibiting unlawful transactions with children.'
Unlike Folda and Swartzenberger, the action in Runge was
brought by a third party who was injured when the car in which he
was riding struck a utility pole. Both the minor driver and his passenger had left a party at the home of one defendant where they
had been served beer. The court in Runge indicated that it would
not impose liability on a social host when the Legislature had yet
to extend liability to vendors through dramshop legislation."0 4 Although it did not refuse to construe the statutes in such a way that
they could support liability, the court said, "Establishing such a
civil cause of action involves considerations of public policy far beyond those presented by the circumstances of the instant case."'"
Under present Montana law, the driver's "drinking and not defendant's serving the beer was the proximate cause of the accident
which resulted in plaintiff's injury. '' °0
97. 177 Mont. 537, 582 P.2d 767 (1978).
98. 179 Mont. 145, 586 P.2d 712 (1978).
99. Swartzenberger, 179 Mont. at 151, 586 P.2d at 715.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-301 (1983).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-6-304 (1983).
102. 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979).
103. MONT.CODE ANN. § 45-5-623 (1983).
104. Runge, 180 Mont. at 94, 589 P.2d at 147.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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The Negligence of the Drinker

The Montana court has apparently adopted the old common
law position that it is the drinking of liquor, not the serving of it,
which constitutes negligence. The court, however, by refusing to
reject Deeds outright, has not completely barred a cause of action.
In refusing to find liability, the court has relied on two theories-contributory negligence and proximate cause.
In Folda, a seventeen year old customer drowned in a creek
outside of a Bozeman bar where she had been served liquor. She
was highly intoxicated and her father sued the bar, claiming that
service to a minor was negligence. 10 7 The court held that her voluntary intoxication was contributory negligence and barred
recovery. 108
An adult patron of a Billings vendor was served alcohol in
spite of his obvious intoxication in Swartzenberger.1°9 Upon leaving the bar, the customer fell down the stairs and sustained fatal
injuries. His ex-wife brought an action against the bar alleging violation of a Montana statute. Since it was not "apparent, or reasonably should have been apparent," to those who served him that the
patron's drinking would result in a fatal fall, the customer's contributory negligence barred any recovery. 110 The court noted that
the decedent had also violated a statute prohibiting public drunkeness. This violation coupled with his voluntary intoxication was
contributory negligence and barred recovery.
Since the decisions in Folda and Swartzenberger, Montana
has replaced contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence.' Under this scheme, negligence on the part of the
drinker would not bar recovery, unless it were greater than the
negligence of the defendant.1 12 It would appear, then, that if a
plaintiff could present a prima facie case of negligence on the part
of a provider of liquor, she would have a cause of action under the
new comparative negligence scheme.
The Montana court may have closed this door in Runge. That
case involved an action brought by a third party against a social
host who served liquor to a minor. Although the Montana court
has never addressed the issue of a host's duty to the guest herself,
the court clearly has said that an injured third party is not barred
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Folda, 177 Mont. at 545, 582 P.2d at 772.
Id. at 546, 582 P.2d at 772.
Swartzenberger, 179 Mont. at 146, 586 P.2d at 713.
Id. at 151, 586 P.2d at 715.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-701, -702 (1983).
Derenberger v. Lutey, - Mont. -, 674 P.2d 485, 487 (1983).
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by the contributory negligence of the drinker. 118 In Runge, the
court refused to hold that Montana's liquor control statute, by itself, created a cause of action.' 14 Refusing to follow Deeds, the
court found the general rule to be "there can be no cause of action
against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person to whom it has been . . .furnished" unless
the person was deprived of "his willpower or responsibility for his
behavior.""' 5 But the court went on to say:
Traditionally, there has been greater justification for imposing liability on a commercial purveyor than on a social purveyor.
There is a greater need for some check on the pecuniary motives
of those engaged in the business of selling alcoholic beverages. In
addition a commercial vendor is in a better position to observe his
customers and monitor their level of intoxication by virtue of the
fact that the seller is more likely to communicate with the patron
each time he serves a new drink.
Taking this into consideration, we are reluctant to extend the
liability of persons serving alcoholic beverages to a social setting
when the legislature has to date failed to extend that liability to
commercial vendors by virtue of dramshop legislation. 6
The court went on to hold that the minor's drinking, not the defendant's serving of the alcohol, was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury."'
4.

The Provider's Willful Misconduct

It does appear that a plaintiff may be able to recover if she
can show willful misconduct on the part of the provider. The court
in Swartzenberger could find no willful misconduct on the part of
the vendor, but cited a California case, Ewing v. Cloverleaf
Bowl," 5 for the proposition that contributory negligence was not a
bar to recovery if the defendant's conduct could be characterized
as willful misconduct.1 9
The actions of the vendor in Ewing were particularly egregious. An experienced bartender served a patron at least ten shots
113. Runge, 180 Mont. at 92, 589 P.2d at 146. In Johnson v. United States, 496 F.
Supp. 597, the defendant successfully raised a defense of assumption of the risk. The federal
court found that the plaintiff was 25% negligent in assuming the risk of riding with an
intoxicated driver. This finding served to reduce the plaintiff's recovery by 25%. Id. at 604.
114. Runge, 180 Mont. at 93, 589 P.2d at 147.
115. Id. at 93, 589 P.2d at 146-47 (quoting 45 Am.JUR. 2D, Intoxicating Liquors § 554).
116. Id. at 94, 589 P.2d at 147.

117. Id.
118.
119.

20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978).
Swartzenberger, 179 Mont. at 149, 586 P.2d at 715.
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of straight rum in a period of an hour and a half. 120 The patron
had informed the bartender that it was his twenty-first birthday. It
soon became obvious to all that the young customer was getting
drunk, yet the bartender continued to serve him in contravention
of the bar's posted policy. 2 ' After returning home, the young man
died of acute alcohol poisoning. His blood alcohol level was determined to be 0.47%. The California court said that the bartender's
acts suggested "not merely a want of ordinary care, but willful
'122
misconduct.
The Montana court, in another context, has said that "negligence is separate and distinct from willful or wanton misconduct."12 Thus, a plaintiff's negligence cannot be compared with a
defendant's willful misconduct under Montana's comparative negligence statute and will not bar recovery. 2 4 Additionally, such misconduct can serve as a basis for exemplary damages. 2 5
B. Legislative Guidance Is Lacking
The court has indicated a need for legislative guidance in addressing the difficult questions raised when alcohol is provided to
minors and intoxicated persons.1 2 6 Such guidance has not been
forthcoming. An "anti-dramshop" act was introduced in the Fortyninth Legislature. The bill as originally proposed would have exempted any "person or entity" who provided alcohol to anyone
under any circumstances from civil liability "for injury or damage
of any kind wholly or partly caused by the consumer's being under
the influence of alcoholic beverages.' 27 The House of Representa120. Ewing, 20 Cal. 3d at 394, 572 P.2d at 1158, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
121. Id. at 403, 572 P.2d at 1158, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
122. Id. at 403, 572 P.2d at 1162, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
123. Derenberger, - Mont. -, 674 P.2d at 487.
124. Id. at -,
674 P.2d at 487-88.
125. Id. at -,
674 P.2d at 490.
126. Runge, 180 Mont. at 91, 589 P.2d at 147.
127. H.B. 395, 49th Leg., (1985). On third reading the bill stated:
A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT PROVIDING THAT CERTAIN
PURVEYORS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY OR DAMAGE CAUSED BY CONSUMERS AS A RESULT OF THE
CONSUMPTION OF SUCH BEVERAGES."
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MONTANA:
Section 1. Selling or giving alcoholic beverages - no LIMITATION OF civil
liability for consumer's acts. Nu (1) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION
(2), NO person or entity that sells, serves, gives, or delivers alcoholic beverages as
defined in 16-1-106, whether or not for profit, in any place, including but not limited to a person's residence, a bar, restaurant, private or nonprivate club or institution, or private or nonprivate business, professional, social, or other party or
event, is liable to any person for injury or damage of any kind wholly or partly
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tives, however, amended the bill and in the process created a
dramshop act. The house amendment said that the exemption
would not apply to anyone who provided liquor to minors in violation of the liquor statutes or the statute prohibiting unlawful
transactions with minors."" As amended, the bill could have had
the effect of creating civil liability for violation of the statutes.
The amended bill passed in the House but received an unfavorable recommendation from the Senate Business and Industry
Committee. Testimony before that committee indicated that the
bill was drafted in response to concern by tavern owners that their
liability insurance rates had risen considerably. 12 9 After hearing
other testimony to the effect that the bill, even as amended, offered far too much protection to providers of alcohol and none to
victims, 3 ' the committee issued a do not pass recommendation.
The Senate followed the committee's recommendation and subsequent attempts to revive the bill failed.I s'

It can be inferred that there was sentiment, at least in the
House of Representatives, which favored imposition of some liability on those who provide liquor in violation of statute. The amendment indicated a willingness on the part of the legislators to provide a remedy for minors and third parties injured as a result of
minors' intoxication. The Senate vote, as well, may suggest that
victims should have greater remedies than those provided in the
amended bill.
C. Policy ConsiderationsFavor Some Liability
Of 204 fatal auto accidents in Montana last year, ninety-nine
involved alcohol. 32 Twenty-eight per cent of injury-producing accidents involved alcohol. 33 Montana, like a number of other states,
caused by the consumer's being under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
(2) SUBSECTION (1) DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY PERSON OR ENTITY
THAT SELLS, SERVES, GIVES, OR DELIVERS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
TO A PERSON UNDER THE LEGAL DRINKING AGE IN VIOLATION OF
16-3-301, 16-6-305, OR 45-5-623.
(italics denote material added by amendment).
128. Id.
129. D. Brown, Remarks at the hearing on H.B. 395 before the Senate Committee on
Business and Industry (March 15, 1985).
130. K. Englund, Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Remarks at the hearing on H.B.
395 before the Senate Committee on Business and Industry (March 15, 1985).

131.

MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT ON STATUS OF HOUSE BILLS,

49th

Leg., at 42 (April 26, 1985).
132. Accident Statisticsfor Montana 1984, available from the Montana Highway Patrol. The statistics additionally show that, of 4799 total drivers involved in alcohol related
accidents, 853 were teenagers.
133. Id.
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is making strong efforts to remove drunken drivers from the highways. Criminal sanctions may be imposed on both the drunken
driver and one who provides liquor in violation of statute.' Criminal sanctions give no relief, however, to one who is injured or killed
by such drivers. The general policy of the law is to afford compensation to those injured by unlawful acts." 5 Yet, under the common
law rule, providers of alcohol, even though they may be violating
the law, are completely insulated from liability. The only justification that has been advanced for this protection is that the drinking, rather than the serving, is the proximate cause of the injury.
Proximate cause, however, is essentially a question of public
policy. 136 "Proximate cause is a twofold legal concept which may
limit liability depending upon the existence of (1) an intervening
act and (2) the unforeseeability of that intervening act." ' 7 As
Judge Jameson noted in Deeds, if the provider of liquor knows
that the drinker will be driving, an accident is a reasonably foreseeable result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
person.138 Other courts have followed this reasoning to conclude
that providing alcohol is a proximate cause of injuries inflicted as a
result of intoxication. Under this analysis "consumption and inthat
jury-producing conduct are foreseeable, intervening causes
39
liability.'
from
alcohol
of
supplier
should not relieve the
If House Bill 395 had become law, Montana could have become one of a number of jurisdictions that define the provider's
duty using liquor control statutes. The problem with this approach
is that it applies the same standard of conduct to vendors and noncommercial providers. As the court noted in Runge, vendors are
frequently in a better position to monitor their patrons than a social host would be.' 4 0 A better approach is to use a common law
negligence analysis.' 4 In this way, the conduct of the provider can
134. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-314, 61-8-401 to -408 (1983).
135. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-202.(1983).
136. Comment, Employer Liability for a Drunken Employee's Actions Following an
Office Party: A Cause of Action Under Respondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 107, 109
(1982). See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1923)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
137. Green v. Hagele, 182 Mont. 155, 160, 595 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1979).
138. Deeds, 306 F. Supp. at 358. See also Johnson, 496 F. Supp. at 604.
139. Note, Expansion of the Duty Concept Via Foreseeabilityof Injury: Otis Engineering Corporation v. Clark, 21 HOUSTON L. REV. 559, 572 n.100 (1984).
140. Runge, 180 Mont. at 94, 589 P.2d at 147. The Wyoming Supreme Court has noted
that vendors are in a better financial position than a minor customer, and may also need the
additional deterrent that civil liability would provide. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d
408, 415 (Wyo. 1983).
141. Graham, supra note 31, at 587.
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be compared to a reasonable person faced with the same set of circumstances. The traditional bar is too broad. Common sense tells
one that there are bound to be situations in which serving alcohol
to a minor or an intoxicated person is negligence. The position that
such serving can never be the proximate cause of harm, however,
will deny relief to an injured party. The Montana court has said
that causation is a fact. 142 Under current Montana law, however, it
is a fact that a plaintiff who has been injured by an intoxicated
person never has a chance to establish.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In view of the fact that drunken driving has become a national
problem and injuries caused by drunken drivers are frequently serious, the common law rule that the drinker is solely responsible
for her actions is no longer viable. The trend across the country is
to recognize at least a limited cause of action for negligently serving alcohol. Most jurisdictions will hold vendors liable, and a few
have extended liability to social hosts. Courts and legislatures have
exhibited particular concern for minor drinkers and third parties
injured by them. Montana is one of only ten jurisdictions refusing
143
to impose any liability.
The time has come for Montana to allow relief to parties injured as a result of negligent provision of alcohol. The people of
Montana have made a commitment to the reduction of drunken
driving. The House of Representatives has indicated that it does
not support absolute protection for providers of alcohol. The court
should look to the well-reasoned analysis of the federal court in
Deeds, and abandon the overbroad common law position in favor
of liability when any provider acts negligently and injury results.

142.
143.

Green, 182 Mont. at 161, 595 P.2d at 1162.
Note, supra note 20, at 290 n.49.
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